their primary concern. In February 1959, 38 per cent of the respondents believed that the maintenance of world peace was the most important problem facing the United States and by May of that year, thepercentage had risen to 44 per cent. In March 1960 , the majority of those who were asked 'what, if you were president, you would regard as your most important task', answered that they would 'work for peace', while a considerable number praised Eisenhower and described hirn as 'their model".'
The 'rnissile gap' controversy, of course, agitated American public opinion. However, there was also an awareness that the issue had political and electoral implications. Für instance, in March 1960, only 15 per cent of the respondents mentioned the 'missile gap' as the most important problem for the United States, while, in an April Gallup poil, half of those interviewed thought that, if the next presidential candidate 'talked about' the 'rnissile gap', this would promote that candidate's chance of election."
Eisenhower's National Security Policy
Eisenhower's popularity rose consistently between February 1959 to January 1960 -from 57 per cent to 71 per cent -weil above his lowest recorded popularity rating of 49 per cent in April 1958. 5 I. THE CASE OF LEBANON: AN ABERRAnON OF THE NEW LOOK?
Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department became increasingly dissatisfied with Eisenhower's post-Sputnik strategy, with its continued stress on deterrence by nuclear weapons. During an NSC meeting on 2 May 1958, Cutler and Dulles demanded the revision of the massive retaliation strategy. The secretary of state claimed that 'the massive nuclear deterrent was running its course as the principal element in our military arsenal'. Cutler, too, urged are-definition of the term limited war in the 1957 basic national security policy document, NSC 5707/8, because, he claimed, limited war 'may not always be confined to less developed areas'. However, both Twining, the chairman of the JCS, and General Thomas White, the chief of staff of the air force, insisted that the United States 'already' possessed sufficient capabilities for waging limited warfare. The defense secretary commented that any change in the definition of limited war as proposed by Cutler, Dulles, and Taylor would entail 'grave potential budget implications'. Dulles countered that what the Pentagon really feared was any diversion of resources at present dedicated to the 'rnaintenance of our nuclear deterrent capability'. He wanted the United States to formulate a 'supplementary strategy' to massive retaliation.
The president could have developed the argument put forward by Twining and White that the United States did have limited war capabilities, but he merely reinforced McElroy's line in insisting that, in order to increase American limited war capabilities, the United States would either have to reduce its nuclear deterrent force or face 'a massive increase' in defence expenditure. The lauer, Eisenhower said, would involve the United States in 'what is euphemistically called a controlled economy'. The meeting did not reach a consensus and as a result there was no change to the reference to limited war in the 1958 basic national security policy document, NSC 5810/1, which was approved by the president at the end of July 1958.
As discussed earlier, under the New Look, American involvement in Iimited war was given the lowest priority. Deterrence and cold war operations were to be major priorities. Nevertheless, during the latter part of
